The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster
While many fail to see the connection between the fall of the Soviet Union and the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, it was arguably the beginning of the end. This tragic incident exposed failures of the Soviet Union that would only be exacerbated in the years leading to its dissolution. Though the actual explosion occurred on April 26, 1986, the problem began festering years earlier. Financial burdens on the Soviet Union led leaders like Deputy Chief Engineer at Chernobyl, Grigori Medvedev, and Ukraine Minister of Energy, Aleksei Makukhin to make decisions that prioritized efficiency and minimized cost. Safety was merely an afterthought. As such, when discussions occurred between Medvedev and Makuhin in 1972 to finalize the design for the Chernobyl Power Plant, they made unheard-of design choices that comprised the safety of the plant for the sole purpose of cutting costs. Firstly, they chose not to build a containment vessel for the facility, which would have prevented serious radioactive release following an incident. Additionally, they chose to produce an RBMK reactor with a positive void coefficient. The positive void coefficient means that if the amount of water, steam, or coolant in the reactor is abnormal, the power can increase uncontrollably until it combusts.
This disregard for safety continued when plant executives like Nikolai Fomin ordered a safety test to continue despite being warned of dangerous conditions within the reactor on the night of the explosion. This night also exemplifies the fear and intimidation tactics commonly used to enforce compliance in the Soviet Union. Two inexperienced engineers were forced to carry out a complicated test that had already been failed by staff members that were years their senior. After repeatedly expressing their concerns, Anatoly Dyatlov–the chief engineer supervising the test–threatened, berated, and dismissed them. Minutes later the reactor exploded. Despite receiving a eyewitness reports of the explosion, he reported to his superiors that the reactor was intact, further delaying potential responses to the accident. In the meantime, hundreds of employees and firefighters called to the scene would be exposed to levels of radiation that would kill them in the following days.
When government officials finally caught wind of the severity of the incident, they called a crisis meeting, the results of which would endanger millions. In the height of the Cold War, government officials felt that they couldn’t afford the international ridicule that was certain to come if the incident was exposed. So, as lethal levels of radiation poured out of the reactor, they did everything they possibly could to keep things quiet. They chose to create a police perimeter around the surrounding town without informing police officers of the radiation or providing protective gear. They ordered that the next shift of staff members clock in. Finally, they delayed evacuation for the neighboring town, Pripyat, for 24 hours, and refused to publicly acknowledge the incident.
In the face of certain death, they convinced the residents of Pripyat, and perhaps themselves, that everything was normal. However when Staff at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden detected dangerous levels of radiation on April 28th, they could no longer maintain the air of secrecy. Scrambling to maintain a semblance of control on the national stage, the Politburo released vague statements diminishing the severity of the disaster. Less than 24 hours later, photos of the smoking, open reactor were released by Washington analysts that accessed a nearby American reconnaissance satellite. Internationally Soviet leadership were seen as incompetent liars, that risked the safety of their own citizens and those in neighboring regions to save face.
This incident exposed the disfunction, dangerous work culture, and serious financial troubles of the Soviet Union to both the international community and its citizens. Upset by the lack of transparency and disregard for human life, understandably conversations of dissolution spread throughout Ukraine and other Soviet States. As you prepare for committee, think of how you may address negative perceptions from the international community and the structural issues that remain after years of cutting corners and prioritizing cost efficiency.
Nahla Owens
Assistant Director
Bibliography
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Hill-Gibbens, Paul. "Timeline Of Events | The Chernobyl Gallery". The Chernobyl Gallery, 2018. http://www.chernobylgallery.com/chernobyl-disaster/timeline/.
Kramer, Sarah. "Here's Why A Chernobyl-Style Nuclear Meltdown Can't Happen In The United States". Business Insider, 2016. https://www.businessinsider.com/chernobyl-meltdown-no-graphite-us-nuclear-reactors-2016-4.
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